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Abstract: In service providing systems, user authentication is required for different purposes such as billing, restricting 
unauthorized access, etc., to protect the privacy of users, their real identities should not be linked to the services that they use 
during authentication. A good solution is to use pseudonyms as temporary identities. On the other hand, it may also be 
required to have a backdoor in pseudonym systems for identity revealing that can be used by law enforcement agencies for 
legal reasons. Existing systems that retain a backdoor are either punitive (full user anonymity is revealed), or they are 
restrictive by revealing only current pseudonym identity of. In addition to that, existing systems are designed for a particular 
service and may not fit into others. In this paper, we address this gap and we propose a novel pseudonym providing and 
management system. Our system is flexible and can be tuned to fit into services for different service providers. The system is 
privacy-preserving and guarantees a level of anonymity for a particular number of users. Trust in our system is distributed 
among all system entities instead of centralizing it into a single trusted third party. More importantly, our system is highly 
resistant to collusions among the trusted entities. Our system also has the ability to reveal user identity fairly in case of a 
request by law enforcement. Analytical and simulation based performance evaluation showed that Collusion Resistant 
Pseudonym Providing System (CoRPPS) provides high level of anonymity with strong resistance against collusion attacks.  
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1. Introduction 
As discussed in [14, 18], the lack of privacy is the main 
hindrance for the success of a service providing system 
that requires user authentication. This encouraged 
service providers to develop a privacy preserving 
system that protects users’ privacy. Most of these 
systems depend on the usage of temporary identities 
instead of real identities. These temporary identities are 
called pseudonyms [10].  
In this paper, we propose a novel pseudonym 
providing system, called Collusion Resistant 
Pseudonym Providing System (CoRPPS). CoRPPS 
distributes trust among all system parties and resists 
against collusion among them to reveal the real 
identities of the users. In this way, CoRPPS ensures a 
level of anonymity for users served by a particular 
service provider.  
We have done analytical and simulation based 
performance evaluation mostly to analyze the security 
and anonymity that CoRPPS provides. Our analytical 
and simulation results show that CoRPPS can be 
applied for different applications with different number 
of users. By a careful selection of CoRPPS’s 
parameters, it is possible to gain high performance 
results.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In 
section 2, we provide a brief survey of the related work. 
In section 3, the design details of our system, CoRPPS, 
are discussed. Resistance of CoRPPS against some 
attacks is also discussed in this section. In section 4, 
we give the performance evaluation of our system. 
Finally section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Related Work 
There are two approaches in the literature that address 
anonymous service access. The first approach is called 
anonymous blacklisting (a.k.a anonymous revocation). 
This approach allows revocation of misbehaved users 
without revealing their real identities [9]. It also 
maintains previous anonymity for even abusive users. 
The second approach is called revocable anonymity 
[9]. In this approach, abusive users are revoked and 
their real identities are revealed as well.  
In anonymous blacklisting, various Trusted Third 
Party (TTP) schemes have been proposed. These 
schemes assume a level of trust between parties. The 
first anonymous TTP blacklisting scheme to appear in 
the literature was proposed by Johnson et al. [19] and 
called Nymble [9]. Nymble constructs unlinkable 
authentication token sequences using hash chains. A 
pair of TTPs, the Nymble manager and the pseudonym 
manager, help service providers to link future tokens 
from abusive users so their access can be blocked. 
Unfortunately, these TTPs can easily collude to de-
anonymize any user.  
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Nymbler [17, 19], BNymble [23], and Jack [22] are 
similar schemes that have been proposed with some 
performance enhancements on the base scheme 
Nymble. With an aim to force an agreement between 
users and service providers, Schwartz et al. [26] have 
proposed a contractual anonymity system. In this 
system, a user is de-anonymized if she breaches the 
contract with the service provider. This system still 
depends on a TTP.  
BLacklistable Anonymous Credential (BLAC) [27], 
Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) [5], Privacy-Enhanced 
Revocation with Efficient Authentication (PEREA) 
[28], and the second generation onion router TOR [11], 
are anonymous service access systems in which abusive 
users are revoked without contacting a TTP. In these 
schemes, service providers simply add authentication 
tokens associated with misuse to a blacklist [24].  
Revocable anonymity systems (the second approach) 
generally depend on cryptography to generate and 
verify anonymous identities that are sometimes called 
pseudonyms [21].  
The use of TTP to sign credentials and reveal real 
identities of pseudonyms was employed by many 
service providing systems such as Vehicular Ad hoc 
Networks (VANETs) described in [6, 7, 8, 13, 16]. In 
these systems, the authors propose the use of 
pseudonyms to access the service anonymously while 
maintaining the ability to revoke abusive pseudonyms 
by revealing their real identities.  
Group signature schemes, such as [2, 3, 4, 20] have 
been widely used for both anonymous blacklisting and 
revocable anonymity systems. Based on group 
signature features, an open authority can revoke 
abusive users and may reveal their real identities [12], 
the author proposed a light weighted protocol for 
anonymous communication over Internet, where the 
cryptography overhead is distributed over sources. A 
similar work was proposed in [29].  
All previous systems are either punitive in a way that 
they allow TTPs to reveal past and future anonymity of 
a particular user, or they are restrictive in a way that 
they allow revealing only current pseudonym. Each 
previously described pseudonym system fits to a 
particular service providing systems and may not fit to 
others. Hence, there is a necessity for a flexible system 
that maintains anonymity, distributes trust, and enables 
fair identity de-anonymization. In this paper, we 
propose a collusion resistant pseudonym providing 
system that addresses these issues, this work is an based 
on the model proposed by [1].  
3. CORPPS Design 
Figure 1 shows the latest version of CORPPS on which 
our system is built on, the system is fully described in 
[28]. Initially,  
 Step 1: CoRPPS’s initial setup is carried out. The 
aim of this stage is to prepare CoRPPS units for 
registering users and providing services to them.  
 Step 2: After that, users register to the registration 
authority using their identification information (2).  
 Step 3: Users apply to a predetermined number of 
authentication servers, ASs, to get tickets. These 
tickets are used by Pseudonym Signer, PS. 
 Step 4: To generate signed pseudonyms.  
 Step 5: Users use the service by authenticating 
themselves using their signed pseudonyms. 
3.1. Assumptions and Threat Model 
In CoRPPS design, we assume that all 
communications among CoRPPS entities are secured 
using Secure Socket Layer (SSL) or another transport 
layer security protocol.  
 
Figure 1. CoRPPS general design and flow. 
Users are assumed to be semi-honest such that they 
follow the protocols properly and does not block the 
continuity of CoRPPS; however, they are curious and 
try to link pseudonyms to the real identities of 
particular users. 
3.2. CoRPPS Basic Building Blocks  
The basic building blocks of CoRPPS, namely tokens 
and token pool, counter, verification code, tickets, and 
pseudonyms. The following subsections summarises 
each of them.  
3.2.1. Tokens and Token Pool 
Tokens are temporary anonymous identifiers which 
help PS to verify that a user is a genuine user. Tokens 
are generated by the registration authority, RA, to be 
used by the authentication servers, ASs, to generate 
users’ tickets.  
3.2.2. Counter 
In CoRPPS, a particular user is assigned a group of 
Authentications Servers, ASs, during registration and 
she always talk to this group of ASs to obtain tickets. 
A particular user U and her corresponding group of 
ASs, maintain a synchronized counter, CtrU. CtrU 
holds the number of times the user U has applied to 
ASs for tickets (i.e., it is something like a session 
User RA 
ASs 
SP 
PS 
(1) 
(2) 
R 
(3) 
(5) 
(4) 
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counter). 
3.2.3. Verification Code  
Verification code, 𝑣, is a value calculated at each 
authentication server whenever a user applies for 
tickets. This code is unique for a particular user, IDU, a 
particular group, GIDU, and a particular CtrU Each time 
user U applies to an AS for a ticket, AS calculates 𝑣 as 
𝑣 = hash(𝐼𝐷𝑈||𝐶𝑡𝑟𝑈||𝐺𝐼𝐷𝑈 ) 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥 
Where IDU is the identity of the user, CtrU is the current 
counter value of user U, GIDU is the group identity of 
the ASs corresponding to that user, and Vmax is the upper 
bound of 𝑣 values. 
3.2.4. Tickets 
Tickets are pieces of encrypted information generated 
by authentication servers, ASs, and sent to the 
Pseudonyms Signer, SP, through the user.  
3.2.5. Pseudonyms  
Pseudonyms are temporary identities used by users to 
apply to the service provider for a service. Users 
generate pseudonyms as random values and send them 
to the Pseudonym Signer, 𝑃𝑆, at which they are signed. 
3.3. CoRPPS’s Features  
In this subsection, we entitle some extra features 
supported by CoRPPS. These features stem from the 
required characteristics and functionality that CoRPPS 
should provide as a pseudonym providing system. 
These include flexibility, identity revealing for liability 
and pseudonym revocation.  
3.3.1. Flexibility 
By flexibility, we mean the possibility of using 
CoRPPS as a general anonymous access system for 
different services. Since service providing systems vary 
according to the nature of the service, the following 
CoRPPS parameters can be tuned to fit into wider range 
of service providers: 
1. Maximum number of pseudonyms allowed to be 
signed in each session NPmax. 
2. The time period that unused pseudonyms are valid 
through, VT period. 
3. Once used, the lifetime of a pseudonym is restricted 
to VFperiod. 
The choice of the above mentioned parameters depends 
on the privacy threats and the required privacy level of 
a particular service providing system.  
3.3.2. Identity Revealing for Liability 
One of the main design criteria of CoRPPS is to 
achieve unlinkability between a pseudonym and the 
identity of its owner. However, law enforcement units 
may require to learn the identity of a pseudonym 
holder in case of a service abuse; a practical system 
should also support such an identity revealing for 
liability reasons. The process of revealing a real 
identity is carried out by collaboration among all 
CoRPPS trusted parties, RA, all ASs, PS and SP; the 
user entities do not take part in this process.  
 Step 1: The service, for which the corresponding 
pseudonym is to be revealed, is sent to service 
provider, SP. SP, then, queries its database and 
returns the target pseudonym, 𝑃𝑈
𝑖 . 
 Step 2: 𝑃𝑈
𝑖  is sent to the pseudonym signer, PS, 
which returns the corresponding combination of 
tokens and the verification code, tcomb, by searching 
its database. 
 Step 3: tcomb is sent to all authentication servers, 
ASs, in the system. Each AS queries its database for 
the set of all user identities, IDUs, to whom any 
combination of tokens and verification code, 
(𝕋, 𝑣), was given. The result, Sj, of each ASj’s 
query is sent back to the identity revealing process. 
Actually, results from the group of ASs that took 
part in generation of 𝑃𝑈
𝑖  would suffice, but the 
pseudonyms, tokens and verification codes do not 
carry this information; thus, all ASs are needed to 
be queried. To finish  
 Step 4: The identity revealing process takes the 
intersection Sjs for each group of ASs (remember 
that ASs are grouped in the setup phase; each group 
has ɡASs and there are (𝑁𝐴𝑆
𝑔
) groups). The 
intersection set for each group, denoted as ℂ𝕌𝑡, is 
an empty set if the corresponding AS group has not 
been employed in the generation process of 𝑃𝑈
𝑖 . 
Finally, the union of all ℂ𝕌𝑡 sets are calculated to 
find out candidate set of IDU, denoted as ℂ𝕌. The 
set ℂ𝕌 is, actually, the set of the user IDs for which 
real identities are to be revealed by RA.  
 Step 4: ℂ𝕌 is sent to RA, which returns the real 
identity/identities of the user(s) in ℂ𝕌, since RA 
keeps the IDU–real identity mappings in its 
database. 
3.3.3. Revocation  
Revocation is the process of stopping to provide 
service to a user. There could be several reasons to 
revoke a user, which are out of scope of this paper. In 
this section, we describe how a user is revoked in 
CoRPPS. To revoke a user, all his signed pseudonyms 
should be blocked from accessing a service.  
 Step 1: RA sends the identity of the user, IDU, to be 
revoked to the group of authentication servers she 
is assigned to. These ASs, respond by sending back 
 (1) 
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a set of all tickets issued for IDU. These tickets are 
listed according to the order of their issuance. 
 Step 2: RA groups each ɡ tickets of the same order of 
issuance together, decrypts them, and generates a 
𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏 from each decrypted group of the ɡ tickets. 
All 𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏s are then grouped in a set called 𝕋ℂ𝑈. 
𝕋ℂ𝑈contains all 𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏s used by user 𝑈 for applying 
to sign pseudonyms. RA then sends 𝕋ℂ𝑈to SP and 
asks her to find out all pseudonyms signed for all 
𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑠 in 𝕋ℂ𝑈. SP lists these pseudonyms in ℝℙ𝑈, 
which is the set of revoked pseudonyms signed for a 
particular user 𝑈.  
 Step 3: PS sendsℝℙ𝑈to theservice provider, SP. SP 
updates her revocation list accordingly. Each time a 
user applies to SP for a service, SP checks the user’s 
pseudonym against the revocation list and then 
proceeds with the service if the provided pseudonym 
is not there. 
3.4. Resistance Against Attacks 
In this section, we describe the level of CoRPPS’s 
resistance against collusion and data disclosure attacks 
mentioned in section 3.1.  
3.4.1. Resistance Against Disclosure of Data 
The basic idea of our design in CoRPPS is to prevent 
the ability of linking a pseudonym to a particular user 
and hence to a particular service. This means that a 
particular party must not be able to combine both 
service and identity information.  
To summarize, in order to find out who has used a 
particular service, the chain of 
pseudonymsticketsUser identityReal identity 
must be followed and this is not possible without 
collusion of all trusted entities of CoRPPS. Partial 
collusions only cause partial problems but do not 
effectively reveal the real identity of a user who used 
particular service. 
3.4.2. Resistance Against Collusions Among 
CoRPPS Entities 
Collusion is defined as “a secret agreement between 
two or more parties for a fraudulent, illegal, or deceitful 
purpose”. In our case, the attack of collusion among 
CoRPPS entities, RA, ASs, PS and SP, aims at revealing 
the real identity of a user who used a particular service. 
As described section 3.4.1, all of these entities must 
collude together (including all ASs) in order to reveal 
the real identity. On the other hand, it is also possible to 
have partial collusions, in which some - but not all-of 
the entities collude. Here, we examine different 
scenarios of partial collusions between system parties 
and explain the resistance level of CoRPPS against 
them.  
The collusions between RA-ASs, RA-PS, RA-SP and 
SP-ASs do not cause any problems since these entity 
pairs do not have a common information-base to yield 
the real identity of a user who used a service.  
Collusion between SP and PS yields the tickets used to 
obtain a pseudonym, which was used to access a 
service. Normally a particular AS does not know the 
other ASs in its groups. However, collusion among a 
subset of all ASs may cause to identify the groups of 
ɡASs that issued the tickets of this pseudonym. This, 
in turn, causes to identify the IDU and then real 
identity with the help of RA. As the number of 
colluding ASs increase, the probability of the attack of 
linking pseudonyms to real identity increase. A 
detailed analysis of this collusion attack is given in 
section 4.2. 
3.4.3. RA-AS-PS Trio Collusion 
A corrupt RA may cooperate with a single AS and the 
PS to identify all pseudonyms by assigning the corrupt 
AS to each group during the setup phase. The 
corrupted AS then replaces 𝑡||𝑣 in 𝐸𝐾(𝑡||𝑣) with 
𝐻𝑀𝐴𝐶(𝐼𝐷𝑈||𝐶𝑡𝑟𝑈) truncated or extended to the 
appropriate length. The PS can then recognize these 
identifiers and associate a pseudonym with a particular 
user. Since it is assumed that the encryption scheme is 
secure, no user will detect this attack. 
Fortunately, this attack can be understood by 
legitimate ASs. The total number of ASs (NAS) and the 
number of ASs per group (𝑔) are publicly known. 
Then it is easy to infer the expected number of groups 
assigned to each AS. Therefore, ASs other than 
corrupted AS in the mentioned attack can easily 
discover this attack by the significance decrease in the 
number of groups they are assigned to.  
3.4.4. Collusions Among CoRPPS Users 
Another attack is the collusion among two or more 
users in order to escape from liability. Remember that 
one of the features of CoRPPS is that real identities 
can be revealed by law enforcement units for a 
liability issue. In order to smoothly run this process, a 
particular user should obtain her tickets from her 
designated group of ASs. In this attack, the cheater 
user exchanges some tickets with some other users 
and submits a mixed set of tickets to the PS to obtain 
signed pseudonyms. In this way, the cheating user 
seems to obtain tickets from some ASs other than her 
group of designated ASs. This situation causes the 
identity revealing process to fail and, therefore, the 
cheater cannot be tracked down by law enforcement. 
However, in order to succeed, the cheater should 
submit tickets of other users that can be verified by 
𝑃𝑆; this is not so possible, as discussed below.  
For two colluding users, with known IDU and CtrU, 
it is not possible to calculate verification code 
precisely. This is because they do not know the group 
ID, GIDU, which is incorporated in the verification 
code calculation shown in Equation 1. Moreover, they 
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cannot obtain 𝑣 out of the tickets since the tickets are 
encrypted and the users do now know the encryption 
key K. However, it is still possible to exchange tickets 
and to have the same verification code with a 
probability of 1/Vmax, where Vmax is the upper bound of 
the verification code values. As mentioned in Section 4, 
the typical value of Vmax is 100; this means that the 
probability of successfully choosing a ticket of the 
same verification code is only 1%. Moreover, 
submitting another user's ticket to PS is a blind trial for 
the cheating user. The reason is that users exchanging 
the tickets cannot precisely determine that the 
exchanged tickets have the same verification code, 
because they do not know GIDU.  
It is easy to discover such an attack by comparing 
the verification code of each ticket. Fortunately, it is 
also possible to identify the cheating users by careful 
selection of CoRPPS parameters. In a CoRPPS system 
of ɡAS s in each group, the best chance for a successful 
attack is to use ɡ-1 tickets having the same verification 
code (i.e., generated for the same IDU, CtrU, and GIDU) 
and then try one ticket from another user. The ɡ-1 
tickets alone may then help in revealing the identity of 
abusive user if we design CoRPPS to have a very low 
collision probability for ɡ-1ASs. The process of 
identifying abusive users is summarized below: 
1. PS detects this attack by testing verification codes 
and storing ticket combinations involved in each 
trial. 
2. If the numbers of trials exceed a threshold, PS 
reports RA with trials and ticket combinations. 
3. RA then runs identity revealing process described in 
section 3.4.1 for all combinations of ɡ-1 tickets in 
each trial. 
4. Performance Evaluation 
We provide detailed performance evaluation of 
CoRPPS in this section. It includes anonymity analysis, 
collusion analysis, and collision analysis. Both 
analytical and simulation results are given. 
4.1. Anonymity Analysis 
𝑘-anonymity metric is widely used to describe the 
anonymity level, it refers to the state of being 
anonymous among another k-1 objects [15, 25]. A 
particular IDU is 𝑘-anonymous at a particular AS if 
there exist other 𝑘 − 1𝐼𝐷𝑈s in AS’s records with the 
same ticket value.  
The ticket reuse is the source of anonymity in each 
AS. If we consider a ticket reuse as a success, we can 
model ticket generation process as a binomial 
experiment. The total number of trials 
𝑛 = 𝑁𝑈 ∗ 𝐶𝑡𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥, 
and the probability of success 
𝑝 = 1/(𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∗ 𝑁𝑡). 
The resulting binomial distribution is B(n,p).  
We simulated the ticket generation process at a 
particular AS. Figure 2 shows the results of both the 
simulation experiment and the fitted binomial 
distribution. 
Figure 2. Analytical and simulation results of ticket generation 
process NU=1000,Ctrmax=1000,Nt =1000, and Vmax=100).  
Table 1 shows k-anonymity levels with c=0.999.  
Table 1. Anonymity level with c=0.999,Ctrmax=1000,Vmax =100. 
𝑵𝑼 
𝑵𝒕 
1000 10000 
10000 71 2 
50000 432 30 
100000 904 71 
250000 2347 203 
500000 4783 432 
1000000 9692 904 
4.2. Analysis of Collusion Among ASs 
 ASs are grouped in groups of ɡ members of total 
number of groups 
𝑔_𝑁𝑜 = (𝑁𝐴𝑆
𝑔
)  
Where NAS is the number of ASs in the system, and 𝑔 
is the number of ASs in each group. Each user is 
assigned a particular group and should apply only to 
ASs of that group. As a result, if the data of ASs of a 
particular group is disclosed, then all tickets provided 
by those ASs to users of the same group are disclosed 
as well.  
4.2.1. Arbitrary Group Disclosure with Respect to 
Disclosed ASs 
The number of arbitrarily disclosed groups by 
collusion among xASs is 
𝑁𝐴𝐺𝐷(𝑥) = (
𝑥
𝑔
) | 𝑥 ≥ 𝑔 
Where x is the number of colluding ASs, and ɡ is the 
number of ASs in each group. Table 3 shows NAGD(x) 
for a system of NAS=10 ASs and ɡ= 4ASs in each 
group. As the number of colluding ASs, x, increases, 
 (2) 
 (3) 
 (4) 
 (5) 
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the number of disclosed groups, NAGD(x), also increases 
as shown in Table 2.  
Table 2. Collusio5n among ASs. 
𝒙 𝑵𝑨𝑮𝑫(𝒙) 
4 1 
5 5 
6 15 
7 35 
8 70 
9 126 
10 210 
4.2.2. Probability of Particular Group Disclosure 
Assuming that x represents the number of colluding ASs 
of a particular user’s groups. The probability of finding 
the other ɡ-xASs of that group is shown in Table 3 and 
is calculated by: 
𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐷(𝑔 − 𝑥) = 1 ∏ (𝑁𝐴𝑆 − 𝑥)
𝑔−𝑥
𝑖=𝑥
⁄  
Where x is the number of colluding ASs of a particular 
user’s group, and ɡ is the number of ASs in each group. 
Table 4 shows PPGD(ɡ-x) for a system of NAS=10ASs 
and ɡ =4ASs in each group. 
Table 3. Probability of revealing a particular group. 
𝒈 − 𝒙 𝑷𝑷𝑮𝑫(𝒈 − 𝒙) 
4 0.00012 
3 0.00198 
2 0.01786 
1 0.14286 
4.2.3. Collision Analysis 
The collision probability is calculated as 
𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
𝐸𝐶
𝑁𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏
  
 Where EC is the expected number of previously used 
tcombs in signing pseudonyms, and 𝑁𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏is the total 
number of different tcombs in the system. 
Each time a user applies to PS, EC is incremented by 
one in the absence of collision, or remains the same if 
collision occurs. On this basis, EC is defined 
recursively in terms of the number of times, n, different 
users apply to PS for signing pseudonyms as:  
𝐸𝐶(𝑛) = 𝐸𝐶(𝑛 − 1) + 1 ∗ (𝑃𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
𝑃𝑛𝑜_𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 1 − 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 
= 1 −
𝐸𝐶(𝑛)
𝑁𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏
 
𝐸𝐶(𝑛) = 𝐸𝐶(𝑛 − 1) + 1 ∗ (1 −
𝐸𝐶(𝑛)
𝑁𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏
) 
𝐸𝐶(𝑛) = 𝑥 ∗ (𝐸𝐶(𝑛 − 1) + 1)  
Where 𝑥 = (
𝑁𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏
𝑁𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏+1
) 
The later is a recurrence Equation with basis EC(1)=0. 
By solving this recurrence using repeated substitutions 
we get 
𝐸𝐶(𝑛) =  𝑥𝑛−1 + 𝑥𝑛−2 + ⋯ + 𝑥 
= (1 − 𝑥𝑛−1) 
We have simulated the pseudonyms signing process, 
and calculated the collision probability for different 
values of users’ counters, CtrU. The simulation and 
analytical collision probability results are shown in 
Figure 3.  
 
 Figure 3. Simulation and analytical collision results Nt=200, 
Vmax=20, NU=100000, Ctrmax=1000, and ɡ=3. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we proposed a novel privacy-preserving 
pseudonym providing system, called Collusion 
Resistant Pseudonym Providing System (CoRPPS). In 
CoRPPS, several trusted entities are employed and the 
task of user authentication is split among several 
authentication servers. Other tasks and the 
corresponding user data are also split among trusted 
entities such that the collusion among them does not 
effectively link the real identity of a user to a 
pseudonym. This approach and the use of reusable 
tokens as anonymous identifiers in our design yielded 
high level of privacy for the users. The challenge of 
this design was that the link between the real user 
identities and pseudonyms should have been 
established by the request of law enforcement. In other 
words, there should have been a backdoor in the 
system, which contradicts the privacy requirements. 
We addressed this challenging issue in CoRPPS by 
enforcing all trusted parties to collaborate in the 
process of identity revealing. Analytical and 
simulation results showed that CoRPPS is applicable 
for different types of services; it can be tuned for 
different number of users according to anonymity 
level required, and the desired maximum collision 
probability. Our performance results also showed that 
CoRPPS is highly resistant against collusion attacks. 
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